

## Message Text

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TO USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

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AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY

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EXDIS

E.O. 11652:GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: SUMMARY REPORT ON OPTION III TRILATERALS

USNATO PLEASE PASS GENERAL HAIG

BEGIN SUMMARY: US, UK AND FRG REPS MET IN WASHINGTON  
FEBRUARY 27-28 FOR TRILATERAL TALKS. THERE WAS NO AGREE-  
MENT ON TIMING ISSUE (UK AND FRG REPS DID NOT ACCEPT US  
ARGUMENTATION IN FAVOR OF INTRODUCING OPTION III TO THE  
EAST BEFORE APRIL 24 END OF PRESENT NEGOTIATING ROUND,  
BUT THEY DID AGREE THAT NAC CONSIDERATION OF US PROPOSAL  
SHOULD BE AS EXPEDITIOUS AS POSSIBLE.) OTHERWISE,  
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INTEGRITY OF OPTION III COMPONENTS WAS MAINTAINED, ALTHOUGH  
FRG PREFERENCE FOR SOMEHOW REMOVING F-4S WAS NOTED. BOTH  
BRITISH AND GERMANS EXPRESSED STRONG INTEREST IN PLAYING  
OPTION III AGAINST COMMON CEILING AND BRITISH HAD STRONG

PREFERENCE FOR EXPRESSING COMMON CEILING NUMERICALLY. DIFFERENCES OF VIEW WERE LARGELY NARROWED TO ISSUES RELATED TO DEFINITION OF COMPONENTS WITHDRAWN AND POST REDUCTION CEILINGS, AND IMPLICATIONS OF OPTION III WITHDRAWALS FOR ALLIED FORCES. THESE LATTER ISSUES ARE TO BE DISCUSSED BY EXPERTS POSSIBLY IN BONN, WEEK OF MARCH 12. ALTHOUGH UK RAISED CONFLATION IDEA, BOTH UK AND FRG RECOGNIZED THAT PHASING ISSUE, REQUIRING FURTHER WORK,

SHOULD BE PUT FORWARD AFTER OPTION III, PERHAPS TO CLINCH THE AGREEMENT. TICKELL MADE "PERSONAL" SUGGESTION THAT OPTION III BE PUT FORWARD TO THE EAST INITIALLY AS PART OF A US PROBE, AND PERHAPS SUBSEQUENTLY ALSO BE SUBJECT OF SEPARATE NEGOTIATION BY US ALONE IN ORDER TO HIGHLIGHT US-SOVIET CONTEXT OF OPTION III PROPOSAL. END SUMMARY.

1. PARTICIPATION: TRILATERAL CONSULTATIONS ON OPTION III WERE HELD IN WASHINGTON FEBRUARY 27-28 UNDER CHAIRMANSHIP OF ACDA DIRECTOR IKLE AND ACDA ACTING ASSISTANT DIRECTOR KLEIN, WITH AMBASSADOR RESOR AND DEPARTMENT AND AGENCY REPRESENTATIVES PRESENT. FRG SIDE WAS LED BY DISARMAMENT COMMISSIONER ROTH ACCOMPANIED BY RUTH OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE, HOFMANN OF THE FRG VIENNA DELEGATION AND COLONELS TANDECKI AND NEBE OF FMOD. TICKELL, LEADING UK SIDE, WAS ACCOMPANIED BY FACER OF UKMBFR DEL, MEHEW AND GERAHTY OF MOD AND NIXON OF FCO.

2. TIMING: BOTH UK AND FRG RESISTED US SUGGESTION THAT OPTION III SHOULD BE PUT FORWARD BEFORE APRIL 24 EASTER BREAK, EXPRESSING DOUBT THAT SOVIETS WERE INTERESTED IN PROGRESS BEFORE CSCE SOLUTION WAS IN SIGHT AND CITING THE SECRETARY IN BONN AND COUNSELOR SONNENFELDT IN NAC IN SUPPORT. TICKELL AND ROTH ALSO DOUBTED THAT "SERIOUS CONSULTATIONS" IN NAC WOULD BE POSSIBLE IN THAT TIME FRAME. ROTH THOUGHT JUNE OR JULY WOULD BE BETTER TARGET DATE. IN ANY EVENT, BOTH SAW SERIOUS ISSUE IN CEILINGS AND DEFINITION PORTIONS OF US PAPER, WHICH RAISED DOUBTS  
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ABOUT ALLIED ABILITY TO MOVE RAPIDLY TOWARD TABLING OPTION III IN VIENNA. TICKELL SAID THAT IF WEST NEEDED TOPICS IN THE INTERIM THERE WAS ALWAYS DATA, WEAKEST LINK IN EASTERN POSITION. US SIDE STRESSED IMPORTANCE OF KEEPING DISCUSSION FOCUSED ON ALLIED OBJECTIVES AND ALLIED PROPOSALS, SAYING THAT PUTTING OPTION III FORWARD WAS MOST LIKELY TO ACHIEVE THESE PURPOSES. WE ALSO STRESSED NEED TO LAY GROUNDWORK IN ANTICIPATION OF SOVIET DECISION TO MOVE IN MBFR AND, IF SUCH DECISION DOES NOT MATERIALIZE, IMPORTANCE OF OPTION III FOR PROVIDING PUBLICLY PLAUSIBLE WESTERN POSITION. ROTH STRESSED THAT FRG WAS UNDER NO TIME PRESSURE. IT WAS UNDERSTOOD THAT QUESTIONS OF TIMING REMAINED DISAGREED PENDING OUTCOME

OF FURTHER EXPERT LEVEL CONSULTATIONS AND FOLLOW-ON NATO DISCUSSIONS (SEE PARAS 10-13 BELOW). UK AND FRG REPS DID AGREE, HOWEVER, THAT NATO DECISION ON US PROPOSAL SHOULD BE MADE AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE.

3. US/SOVIET BILATERAL PROBE OR CONTACT: NEITHER UK NOR FRG REPS PRESSED FOR SERIATIM APPROACH TO OPTION III PRESENTATION. TICKELL IN PARTICULAR EMPHASIZED IMPORTANCE

OF MAINTAINING INTEGRITY OF OPTION III PACKAGE. TICKELL MADE "PERSONAL" SUGGESTION THAT US UNDERTAKE AT HIGH LEVEL (E.G. THE SECRETARY) INITIAL BILATERAL PROBE OF SOVIETS TO MAINTAIN INTEGRITY OF NUCLEAR PACKAGE, POSSIBLY FOLLOWED BY FURTHER US BILATERAL NEGOTIATION WITH OTHER SIDE IF SOVIETS AGREE TO MAINTAIN INTEGRITY OF THE PACKAGE. SPECIFICALLY, TICKELL SUGGESTED THAT WE CAN MAKE INITIAL BILATERAL CONTACTS WITH THE USSR ALONG FOLLOWING LINES: (1) DESCRIBE THE CHARACTER OF THE NUCLEAR PACKAGE STRESSING ITS UNIQUE APPLICATION TO PHASE I, AND THAT WE ARE SEEKING TO FACILITATE SERIOUS NEGOTIATION OF MBFR; (2) DISCUSS THE MODALITIES FOR HANDLING THE PACKAGE WITHIN THE NEGOTIATIONS; (3) STRESS THE IMPORTANCE THE US ATTACHES TO THIS INITIATIVE; AND (4) DISCUSS TIMING FACTORS ASSOCIATING MBFR WITH OTHER NEGOTIATIONS. TICKELL SAID THIS PROCEDURE WOULD HAVE THE ADVANTAGE OF EMPHASIZING US CHARACTER OF THE TRADE AND SEPARATING OFFER FROM ISSUES RELATED TO ALLIED FORCES AND, FINALLY MAINTAINING ITS INTEGRITY. RUTH SAID HE PREFERRED INTRODUCTION OF OPTION SECRET

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III PACKAGE IN VIENNA, THEN A BILATERAL REINFORCEMENT BY THE US; HOWEVER, AN INITIAL BILATERAL PROBE TO PAVE THE WAY COULD BE USEFUL. THE THIRD TIME TICKELL TOUCHED ON THIS POINT HE QUALIFIED BILATERALISM BY STRESSING NEED TO KEEP MAIN FOCUS OF OPTION III NEGOTIATIONS IN VIENNA IF SOVIETS DID NOT AGREE TO MAINTAIN INTEGRITY OF THE OPTION III PACKAGE AS PROPOSED. HE AGREED WITH US VIEW THAT BILATERAL APPROACH IMPLIED DANGER OF BEING TAKEN AS US FBS INITIATIVE, DESIGNED TO KEEP ALLIED SYSTEMS UNCONSTRAINED. NEVERTHELESS, TICKELL THOUGHT IDEA WAS WORTH CONSIDERING WHICH US SIDE AGREED TO DO.

4. "CONFLATION", AND EMPHASIS ON COMMON CEILING: ALTHOUGH BOTH UK AND FRG SPOKESMEN MADE RITUAL REFERENCES TO TANK ARMY NEGOTIATING OBJECTIVE, TICKELL IN PARTICULAR INSISTED THAT OPTION III, AS BEST ALLIED CARD, SHOULD BE PLAYED AGAINST THE COMMON CEILING. HE SAID THE "CONCEPT" WAS TOO IMPRECISE A PHASE I GOAL AND THAT THE COMMON CEILING SHOULD BE DEFINED NUMERICALLY, STRESSING THAT THE TRADE OF OPTION III FOR EASTERN AGREEMENT TO A NUMERICALLY DEFINED COMMON CEILING IN PHASE I WOULD PROVIDE A FAVORABLE PHASE II EFFECT BY ACHIEVING A NUMERICAL FRAMEWORK

FOR THE SECOND PHASE. US SIDE SAID THIS ISSUE NEEDED TO BE STUDIED, BUT DID NOT REQUIRE SOLUTION NOW.

5. TICKELL SAID THAT IN VIEW OF EASTERN OBJECTIONS TO BOTH ASYMMETRY AND PHASING, IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO REACH ACCOMMODATION WITH THE EAST ON BOTH ISSUES. HE THOUGHT THAT A MODIFICATION OF THE ALLIED PHASING CONCEPT WOULD ENHANCE CHANCES OF ACHIEVING WESTERN OBJECTIVES.

TICKELL ILLUSTRATED HIS IDEA BY SKETCHING OUT AN ILLUSTRATIVE FOUR STAGE APPROACH AS FOLLOWS:

- A. US/SOVIET WITHDRAWALS
- B. SOME LIMITED EUROPEAN WITHDRAWALS, WITH NO NATIONAL SUBCEILINGS
- C. REMAINING US/SOVIET WITHDRAWALS
- D. ALL THE PARTICIPANTS WITHDRAW OR REDUCE TO REACH THE COMMON CEILING

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6. TICKELL ADDED THAT AFTER COMPLETION OF US/SOVIET WITHDRAWALS ALLIES WOULD HAVE A CEILING ON SOVIETS WITHOUT A CEILING ON EUROPEAN FORCES. SECONDLY, WITHOUT THE NEED TO AGREE ON SPECIFIC FIGURES AT THE BEGINNING OF NEGOTIATIONS, AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE ON HOW TO PROCEED WOULD ACCELERATE THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS THUS MAKING MORE SPECIFIC AGREEMENTS EASIER TO REACH SUBSEQUENTLY. HE SAID THE BRITISH WERE WILLING TO PRESENT THESE IDEAS MORE FULLY IN WRITING.

7. RUTH SAID PHASES WERE CLEARLY MARKED IN MINDS OF ALLIES AND EASTERN REPS AS TWO PARTS OF A WHOLE BOUND TOGETHER BY COMMON CEILING IDEA. WHILE HE CONCEDED POSSIBILITY OF TELESOPING PHASES WHILE RETAINING COMMON CEILING IDEA HE DOUBTED THIS WOULD MAKE SOVIETS MORE REASONABLE ON PHASING AND WAS THEREFORE INCLINED TO STICK TO PRESENT PHASING PLANS AND SEE WHAT RESULTS OPTION III WOULD BRING. AMB. RESOR AGREED WITH FRG VIEWS, NOTING THAT WE HAVE ALREADY TOLD EAST ALL THAT WE CAN PRUDENTLY SAY ON PHASING BEFORE INTRODUCING OPTION III. TICKELL ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE UK DID NOT MAINTAIN THAT PHASING MUST BE DISCUSSED FIRST. BECAUSE OTHER SIDE KNOWS ABOUT OPTION III, HE SAID, WE MUST GO AHEAD WITH IT FIRST. THE BRITISH OBJECTIVE WAS MERELY TO PLACE THEIR VIEWS ON RECORD SINCE THEY EXPECTED EAST TO CHALLENGE OPTION III IN SUCH "MESSY NEGOTIATIONS". TICKELL THOUGHT PHASING MIGHT PROVIDE FINAL "SHOVE" TO GET EAST TO MOVE TOWARD ALLIANCE APPROACH.

8. F-4S AND AIR MANPOWER: WITHOUT PRESSING ISSUE, FRG REPS MADE PRESENTATION OF GERMAN ANXIETIES ABOUT INCLUSION OF F-4S IN OPTION III PACKAGE. THEY EXPRESSED INTEREST

IN ALTERNATIVES SUCH AS SUBSTITUTING AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS OR NUCLEAR TO CONVENTIONAL AIRCRAFT CONVERSIONS FOR ACTUAL AIRCRAFT REDUCTIONS. UK REPS FOR THEIR PART SAW F-4S AS MAJOR BARGAINING ELEMENT, TO BE RETAINED ALTHOUGH THEY TOO HAD RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE IMPACT OF F-4 WITHDRAWALS ON ALLIED PLANS TO INTRODUCE NEW AIRCRAFT E.G. UK PLANS TO INTRODUCE JAGUAR. THEY AGREED TO ADDRESS THESE ISSUES IN CONNECTION WITH DEFINITION AND CEILING

QUESTIONS (SEE PARAS 10-12 BELOW).

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9. GERMANS ALSO REMAINED CONCERNED ABOUT AIR MANPOWER ISSUES. GERMANS WERE PLEASED THAT AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS WERE TIED TO OPTION III, THEREBY AVOIDING A PHASE II PRECEDENT. THEY WONDERED WHETHER THERE SHOULD BE AIR GROUND AGGREGATE AIR MANPOWER CEILINGS, WITH LIMITED FREEDOM TO MIX AS US SEEMED TO PREFER, OR AN AIR GROUND AGGREGATE CEILING WITH GROUND FORCE MANPOWER SUBCEILINGS. FRG PREFERRED LATTER, BUT RUTH MADE CLEAR THIS WAS NOT MAJOR ISSUE. THERE WAS NEVERTHELESS GENERAL AGREEMENT THAT WHILE WEST HAD OPTIONS FOR THE REDUCTIONS OF AIR MANPOWER IN CONNECTION WITH THE WITHDRAWAL OF OPTION III F-4S, SUCH AS TAKING CREDIT FOR AIR MANPOWER FREED BY THE REDUCTION OF AIRCRAFT, AND EITHER SUBSUMING THESE UNDER THE 29,000 US TOTAL OR ADDING THEM TO THE TOTAL, THESE ISSUES COULD BE RESOLVED INDEPENDENTLY OF THOSE RELATED SPECIFICALLY TO OPTION III.

10. DEFINITIONS AND CEILINGS: MOST OF THE DETAILED DISCUSSIONS IN THESE TRILATERALS RELATED TO ISSUES OF DEFINITIONS AND CEILINGS. NEITHER UK NOR GERMANS LIKED GENERAL NON-CIRCUMVENTION APPROACH TO ESTABLISHING CEILINGS, AND THOUGHT IT IMPORTANT TO ESTABLISH MORE PRECISE CONSTRAINTS ON SOVIETS, RECOGNIZING POSSIBLE EFFECTS ON US SYSTEMS. GERMANS WERE AFRAID THAT VERY GENERAL FORMULATIONS WOULD TEND TO COVER EUROPEAN EQUIPMENT ACQUISITIONS IN CURRENT OR POST PHASE I ERA, AND GIVE EAST INTOLERABLE RIGHTS OF INTERFERENCE IN WESTERN DEFENSES. GERMANS PREFERRED NARROWER DEFINITIONS AND GREATER PRECISION, AS DID UK. GERMANS ALSO EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER PROSPECT THAT GENERAL NON-CIRCUMVENTION APPROACH WOULD LEAD TO CONTINUING DIALOGUE WITH THE EAST OVER INTERPRETATIONS OF EQUIPMENT RESTRAINTS, IMPLYING THE NECESSITY OF A SALT-TYPE SCC. AFTER MUCH DISCUSSION ISSUES WERE NARROWED DOWN AS FOLLOWS:

A. WHETHER DEFINITIONS OF SYSTEMS WITHDRAWN SHOULD BE NARROW OR BROAD: WHETHER AIRCRAFT SHOULD BE DEFINED AS NUCLEAR CAPABLE F-4 OR NUCLEAR CAPABLE AIRCRAFT; WHETHER PERSHING LAUNCHERS SHOULD BE IDENTIFIED AS SUCH, OR AS SSMS WITH RANGES GREATER THAN AN AGREED FIGURE.

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B. LIMITATIONS ON RESIDUAL LEVELS OF US NUCLEAR ELEMENTS AND SOVIET TANKS. HERE THE QUESTIONS RELATE TO: SHOULD NUCLEAR CAPABLE FOLLOW-ONS TO US F-4S BE CONSTRAINED WITHIN THE CEILING ON REDUCED ELEMENTS OR ONLY COVERED BY GENERAL NON-CIRCUMVENTION; AND SIMILARLY; CAN SOVIET TANK FOLLOW-ON MODELS BE CONSTRAINED WITHIN THE CEILING ON

REDUCED ELEMENTS OR MUST THEY BE LEFT TO NON-CIRCUMVENTION.

C. ON RECIPROCITY OR LIMITATION ON ARMAMENTS REDUCED BY THE OTHER PARTY (US TANKS AND SOVIET NUCLEAR ELEMENTS) BOTH THE UK AND FRG HELD THAT RECIPROCITY NEEDED TO BE PROVIDED FOR IN SOME MANNER WHILE ACKNOWLEDGING THAT NO ONE ON THE WESTERN SIDE WANTED TO FREEZE DISPARITIES IN THE EAST'S FAVOR.

11. UK AND FRG ASKED WHETHER SPECIFIC RECIPROCAL WARHEAD LIMITATIONS WOULD BE PROPOSED, NOTING OUR UNCERTAINTY ABOUT THE NUMBER OF WARHEADS ON THE EASTERN SIDE OF THE NGA; WONDERED WHETHER SOVIET SCUDS AND FROGS WOULD BE COVERED AND TO WHAT EXTENT (OR ONLY SCALEBOARD); AND HOW TO DEFINE SOVIET AIRCRAFT, BY SPECIFIC TYPE, BY AIRCRAFT IN NUCLEAR COMMITTED UNITS, OR BY MORE GENERAL DEFINITIONS. FINALLY ALLIES ASKED WHETHER THE "SIGNIFICANT INCREASES" CONCEPT SHOULD BE TIGHTENED BY SPECIFYING PERMISSABLE PERCENTAGE INCREASES.

12. FRG REPS WERE PARTICULARLY CONCERNED OVER POTENTIAL LIMITATIONS ON ALLIED NUCLEAR SYSTEMS. THEY QUESTIONED US SOLUTION ENVISAGING A NON-CIRCUMVENTION CLAUSE COMMITTING THE ALLIES IN PHASE I NOT TO NULLIFY US REDUCTIONS BY INCREASES IN THE COLLECTIVE LEVEL OF THEIR OWN FORCES. THIS CLASS OF ISSUES BOILED DOWN TO WHETHER A NON-CIRCUMVENTION APPROACH SHOULD EXPRESSLY BE LIMITED TO INCREASES IN THE COLLECTIVE LEVEL OF THOSE NATO ELEMENTS OF THE TYPE WITHDRAWN BY THE US AND HELD BY WESTERN PARTICIPANTS; WHICH EUROPEAN AIRCRAFT SHOULD BE LIMITED; AND SHOULD ANY PERMISSIBLE INCREASES UNDER THIS APPROACH BE SPECIFIED, AND WHAT LEVEL.

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13. TICKELL PROPOSED WORKING GROUP OF EXPERTS TO PREPARE PAPER ON DEFINITIONS. HE ADDED THAT IF US USED ITS ORIGINAL PAPER FOR NATO CONSULTATIONS UK WOULD HAVE TO MAKE COMMENTS BEFORE IT COULD SUPPORT IT IN NATO. US REPS SUGGESTED THAT UK AND FRG PROVIDE THEIR PREFERRED APPROACHES TO ABOVE CEILINGS ISSUES BY MARCH 10. IN

THE MEANTIME US WOULD ATTEMPT TO REFINE ITS OWN  
PREFERENCES LOOKING FORWARD TO TRILATERAL EXPERTS MEETING  
FOCUSED ON CEILING AND DEFINITION ISSUES PERHAPS IN BONN,  
CIRCA MARCH 12.

14. US ACKNOWLEDGED THAT CEILINGS ISSUES COULD BEST BE  
CONSIDERED IN TRILATERAL EXPERTS MEETING, AND OTHER  
ISSUES COULD BE DEALT WITH THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS.  
AS TO MODALITIES OF FUTURE ALLIANCE DISCUSSIONS, US  
SIDE SUGGESTED THAT AMERICAN PAPER MIGHT BE REFINED ON

THE BASIS OF EXPERTS MEETING BUT WISHED TO GO FORWARD  
TO NATO AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE. US (AND UK) SAW NO  
PROBLEM WITH LEAVING SOME ISSUES UNRESOLVED BETWEEN  
US/UK/FRG. THESE COULD BE DISCUSSED FURTHER IN  
NATO. FINALLY US SUGGESTED, AND FRG/UK REPS AGREED,  
THAT MODALITIES OF TREATMENT WITHIN ALLIANCE COULD  
BE DISCUSSED BY UK/US/FRG PERM REPS. LATTER STEP  
COULD WAIT UNTIL AFTER EXPERTS HAD MET. BOTH TICKELL  
AND RUTH POINTED OUT THEIR NEED TO BRING RESULTS OF  
TRILATERAL DISCUSSIONS TO THEIR RESPECTIVE MINISTERS, A  
STEP REQUIRED BEFORE ANY UK OR FRG NATIONAL DECISIONS ON  
OPTION III COULD EMERGE. INGERSOLL

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